Canadian-Asian Affairs

Introduction

The emergence of an increasingly unified Overseas Chinese community brings to light debate over changing forms of ethnic and national organization in today’s globalizing world. New diasporic visualizations are gaining power, and relevance. The traditional nation-state’s monopoly on international influence is increasingly being shared with other actors. Some of that influence is becoming vested in transnational ethnic communities. The Chinese diaspora demonstrates this transference of power from traditional centralized authority to a dispersed, globalized community.

While the Chinese diaspora has existed, in one way or another, for many hundreds of years it has undergone a process of re-organization over the past four decades. Revolutions in communications, travel, and international activity have led to increasing ease of association within the overseas Chinese community. This has resulted in increased transnational activity within the Chinese diaspora, which in some ways has subverted traditional national borders and identities. Our answers to the questions of how best to handle this transformation and what it means to the future of immigrant societies such as Canada will help determine our national identity in years to come.

It is important to note that any study of group relations, such as this one risks reducing the individual’s identity to simply that of a group member. The overseas Chinese community is a complex, variegated one. Divisions exist along linguistic, class, demographic, and sub-ethnic lines. Constituents of the Chinese diaspora do not necessarily identify themselves as such. I seek only to trace some of the general trends within the overseas Chinese community and its relations with other populations. By no means do these generalities apply to all members of the community in all areas of the world.

A Short History of the Overseas Chinese

China has been an immigrant sending area for many hundreds of years. The original migrants were mostly males originating from the south of China. They traveled overseas throughout Southeast Asia as merchants. In 1567 China legalized maritime trade and began sending 50 junks per year to the region. This quickly gave rise to a large Chinese trading network in port cities. These cities such as Manila, Patani, the Dutch port of Batavia, and many others all came to have large Chinese populations. Traders settled to do business in the cities and integrated with the local societies to varying degrees.

The seventeenth century saw sustained commercial activity, and increasing political migration. The Qing and Ming authorities sent soldiers and advisors throughout the Indochinese peninsula to establish pro-China polities, and influence the policies of other established kingdoms.

The establishment of Bangkok by Rama I, a half-Chinese half-Thai prince, led to a great increase in Chinese representation in Southeast Asian trade. Traders of Chinese descent dominated shipping into and out of Bangkok. The Chinese population of Siam became economically essential to the maintenance of the Siamese state. At the same time, Chinese miners were immigrating into the small states of the Southeast Asian archipelago. These merchants, miners, and other Chinese settlers would eventually come to dominate commercial exchange in these regions.

This period between the sixteenth and nineteenth century forms the first important wave of Chinese migration. This wave was directed primarily at the trading areas of Southeast Asia, and led to significant Chinese minorities having disproportionate control of the economic sectors in the region. The next wave of migration came between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. This saw an influx of Chinese migrants into areas across the world. North America, Europe, Australasia, and even Africa to a degree, became home to Chinese populations. These migrants were aimed not so much at the trading centres as the peripheries of these societies. Chinese labourers came and took menial jobs within the nascent states of North and South America, and in European colonies worldwide. Eventually these Chinese, like their Southeast Asian predecessors, would be drawn to the cities in these new countries.

The final wave of migration, which is still taking place today, is focused directly at the centres of established, developed countries. Large cities are now the destination of choice. Instead of consisting of principally physical labourers, the new wave of migration is formed of a variety of individuals. Males, females, rich, poor, educated, and uneducated all are represented within the body of recent Chinese migrants. Migration to Western countries experienced a surge during the 1980s and 1990s, when uncertainty about the 1997 reunification of China and Hong Kong led many Hong Kong citizens to seek alternate citizenship.

Like people throughout the developed world, the newly arrived Chinese and their now well-established predecessors are increasingly mobile and have access to revolutionary forms of communication. Space has shrunken within the Chinese diaspora. We now see mobilization across the community and expression of a more unified identity. Over the past thirty years the ties that bind the worldwide Chinese community have, in many ways, strengthened.

Diaspora Re-Organized

Increasing mobility and access to communication has contributed to a re-organization of global diaspora. While it was once almost untenable for overseas Chinese to maintain extensive ties with other overseas communities and mainland China, it is now possible to maintain many relationships across the globe simultaneously. This new ease of relating has led to improved relationships, which has subsequently led to an increased sense of unity within the Chinese diaspora.

The increasing unity of identity within Overseas Chinese communities is dependent upon a reification of Chinese ethnicity. Individuals whose families have lived away from China for over a century are as entitled to membership in the Chinese diaspora as those who migrated from Hong Kong in the 1990s, provided they can demonstrate ethnic ties to China. Ties between Overseas Chinese communities, and to China - whether emotional, kinship, economic, or physical – are becoming stronger and stronger. The on-going discourses regarding Chinese values, Confucianism, Pacific business, and greater China have led to more wide spread agreement on what it is to be Chinese. Arif Dirlik points to these discourses and their effects upon the Overseas Chinese community when he identifies the “re-sinicization” of the Chinese diaspora.

This ‘re-sinicization’ has had a number of causes and effects. High on the list of causes is the re-emergence of China as an important global power, and the increased accessibility of China for physical return and capital investment. Accentuating ties to China has been a profitable exercise for many elements of the Overseas Chinese community. Access to cheap labour and a growing middle-class market has brought investment flooding into China. The constituents of the Chinese diaspora are particularly well placed to take advantage of these markets, and it has thus been within their interest to articulate their ‘Chineseness’ to the fullest extent possible.

Ien Ang argues that the increasing awareness of the Chinese diaspora and the ‘re-sinicization’ thereof has been propelled by a desire to “belong to a respectable imagined community…[which] is so much larger and more encompassing…than any territorially bounded nation.” While this emotional desire for belonging may indeed play a role in the re-organization of the Chinese diaspora, Ang’s further comment that diaspora “signifies triumph over the shackles of the nation-state and national identity” suggests that membership in diaspora precludes ascribing to a national identity. This is an overly exclusive interpretation of identity. Claims such as these endanger diasporans globally by suggesting they cannot remain loyal to both their resident states, and their ethnic brethren. Members within the Chinese diaspora can orient themselves toward China, and other Overseas Chinese, in many ways, and still remain loyal and valuable citizens of their resident states. These citizens nurture multiple loyalties remaining true to their transnational compatriots as well as their fellow citizens in their state of residence.

Historically the Chinese diaspora has been divided quite clearly upon linguistic lines. Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, Mandarin, and other dialect speakers at one time organized within their own respective communities. However the re-organization of the Chinese diaspora has led to a rise in the popularity of the Mandarin dialect. The choice of both the PRC and the Republic of China on Taiwan to select Mandarin as the official language has lent it an official air, and given knowledge of it value as a business skill in China. Increasingly members of the Chinese diaspora choose to learn Mandarin as a supplement to, or even as, their primary dialect. Singapore’s learn Mandarin first campaign is an excellent example of this drive towards a linguistic unity.

The re-organization of the Chinese diaspora has had a number of impacts upon the community itself and the world at large. Contributing to Dirlik’s concept of ‘re-sinicization’, Aihwa Ong identifies the rising importance of Confucian culture which binds together disparate populations of Overseas Chinese, as one of these impacts. Ong argues, very convincingly, that the new-found influence of Asians in global affairs has enabled them to participate more actively in the definition of ‘Oriental’. Contrary to Said’s one-sided definition of Orientalism as an act engaged in by the West upon the East, Ong claims that the Chinese diaspora now takes part in Orientalizing itself. This has led to increasing importance of Confucian values to individuals who very likely have never read any Confucius, which in turn has led in many cases to a justification of the male dominated social order within the Chinese diaspora. Oriental identity is increasingly being essentialized by Orientals themselves.
This new-found ability to articulate a coherent cultural identity has enabled the overseas Chinese community to present an alternative to Western modernity. By drawing upon the cultures within their respective resident communities and the new internationalized Chinese culture, the Chinese diaspora has created a collection of hybrid identities. These hybrid identities are at ease relating with their surrounding communities, with other Overseas Chinese communities, and with communities in China.

This ease of inter-relating is demonstrated by the organizations which act to unite Overseas Chinese communities together, and with the homeland, and in the organizations which help to integrate Overseas Chinese communities in their countries of residence. In 1991, what amounts to an international Chinese chamber of commerce was established with the advent of the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention. This group meets every two years to build relations between business people of Chinese ethnicity. In a similar vein The World Huaren Federation’s mission is to develop relations within the Chinese diaspora, and between overseas Chinese and their non-Chinese neighbours. The equivalent organization within China is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, which is charged with promoting interaction between established overseas Chinese, new migrants, and mainlanders. One of the major functions of the office is to promote business links between overseas Chinese and the mainland. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities see a valuable source of investment in overseas Chinese communities.

These various organizations and government ministries are manifestations of the increasing inter-connectedness of the Chinese diaspora. As well as providing clear examples of diasporic organization, these associations provide forums within which Diasporic identity discourse may take place. What it is to be an overseas Chinese is increasingly being defined by the actions, publications, and policies of these global associations.

The Chinese Diaspora in an International World System

The Chinese diaspora has had various impacts upon the international order. The act of migration itself, moving populations from one region to others, changes the composure of the world. Likewise, shifting identities and changing relations can act to transform the way the international system is ordered.

Perhaps the country most profoundly affected by the emergence of an organized Chinese diaspora is China itself. Between the founding of the PRC, and the Deng Xiaoping era, migration from China was officially perceived as undesirable. It was discouraged via a complex, and highly regulated passport system. However, in more recent years migration has become increasingly encouraged by the PRC. Migration is now seen as one of many modernizing, internationalizing forces that are helping to strengthen China, and develop stronger international relations. The transformation of PRC policy towards migrants is expressed in the change of the official stance towards student migrants. The slogan for overseas students used to be “return and serve” it has now been changed to “serve the country.” This change is the result of Beijing’s acknowledgment that some overseas students will not return to China. Nonetheless, the regime attempts to retain relations with these students, and encourages them to maintain loyalties to China during their overseas residency, no matter how long it may be.

Diasporan investment in mainland China has been another consequence of the re-organization of diaspora. While it is difficult to procure statistics on which investment is backed by ethnic Chinese, we can look to investment in China from ASEAN countries as an indicator of increased Diasporan investment. Investment from ASEAN countries into China has increased from $42.8 million US dollars in 1979 to $3289 million in 2001. While this investment is not strictly from ethnically Chinese sources, we can extrapolate from the Chinese representation within ASEAN economies that it a significant portion of it is invested by ethnic Chinese interests. This investment within China by the diaspora community acts to strengthen the relationship between overseas Chinese and the mainland from both perspectives. Overseas Chinese are anxious to maintain, and improve relations in China, and mainlanders are very interested in procuring as much investment, especially ethnic Chinese investment, as possible. Ethnic Chinese investment is perceived as more desirable by mainland Chinese governments and industries. It is believed that familial and geographic ties between overseas Chinese and China creates investors with a greater stake in the well-being of China. Many of these investors are indeed important philanthropists within China.

Due to historical circumstances Southeast Asia has by far the largest portion of the world’s roughly twenty-five million overseas Chinese. Approximately twenty million people within Southeast Asia identify themselves as Chinese. This does not include much of the population which is of mixed Chinese/other origin. Apart from Singapore, the Chinese communities within these countries are minority populations. The re-organization of the Chinese diaspora has had varying impacts upon the region.

The Chinese percentage of the total population varies greatly amongst Southeast Asian countries, from Singapore’s 77% to Myanmar’s 0.7%. The integration of Chinese communities has also varied greatly throughout the region. Chinese business people control a disproportionate share of the economy in most of these countries. This has led to intermittent strife between local populations and Chinese communities.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 brought much of this discord to the surface, especially in Indonesia. Although the Chinese communities within Indonesia are well-established, with some families able to trace their Indonesian residence back hundreds of years, animosities between indigenous Indonesians and Chinese have been on the rise. The perceived unity of the Chinese community and their links to other Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, and on the mainland, have led some indigenous Indonesians to assume that the loyalties of the Chinese lie more with their ethnic brethren than with the Indonesian nation. When the economy collapsed in 1997-1998 many Indonesians blamed it upon the business activities of the Chinese. This led to anti-Chinese riots and gang-rapes in 1998 as the Chinese community was scapegoated for the plight of the economy.

In some ways the emergence of a stronger Chinese diaspora acts to upset the position of the Chinese within some Southeast Asian societies. Diasporic organization can be perceived as kabalistic, and these interpretations can provide fuel for ethnic strife. This divisive aspect of diaspora is not directly attributable to the diaspora itself, rather responsibility for these occurrences lies with the host culture. Ethnic division and resident country integration must be examined and developed to maintain the viability and health of the Chinese diaspora.

The Chinese diaspora experience in the New World has been quite different from that in the Southeast Asia. After about a century of marginalization the removal of racially discriminatory immigration laws and the introduction of various doctrines of multi-culturalism have legitimized hyphenated identities, such as Chinese-Canadian, or Asian-Australian. While anti-Asian racism does still exist in these countries the Chinese diaspora has become relatively well integrated into the resident societies. That said, the changes that have taken place within the overseas Chinese communities over the past few decades have led to a division within the New World Chinese communities. Those Chinese who immigrated in previous generations and those who are economic immigrants form one part of the community, while the upwardly mobile capitalist immigrants form the other. Constituents of the first section of the community are generally more integrated into their resident societies, while the latter have a more flexible interpretation of citizenship.

The capitalist immigrants hail largely from Hong Kong, and Taiwan. They remain upwardly mobile, often working on one side of the Pacific and residing on the other. The new organization of the Chinese diaspora, which has been repeatedly referred to here, is best represented within this segment of the population. These individuals form composite citizenships, and in fact often hold multiple passports. They retain strong ties to the communities in their sending countries and build ties in their receiving countries. At the same time they participate in the global network of overseas Chinese, and deal extensively with the Chinese communities in their new resident countries. This particular portion of the Chinese diaspora has been essential in increasing exchange and discourse between the New World, the overseas Chinese communities, and China itself.

In many ways the Chinese diaspora has contributed to the weakening of national borders, and traditional definitions of the nation state. Arif Dirlik expresses this well when he states that “what diaspora discourse challenges is not nationalism per se, but a nationalism that is premised on the coincidence of state, territory, population, and culture.”
The upwardly mobile nature of the new diasporans and their capital has created a force to be reckoned with on the international stage. While suggesting a monolithic unity of intent or action to the Chinese diaspora would be a mistake, there certainly have been trends within the past few decades suggesting that this community has come to an increasingly unified cultural visualization. China has certainly benefited from the increased influence and power of this community. How other countries have reacted, and will react in the future, to the emerging importance of global diaspora has been, and will be, very important for the future of the international order.

New Interpretations of Nationalism

New interpretations of nationalism must be allowed to address the weakening of the traditional definitions of nationalism caused by the re-organization of the Chinese diaspora, and other transnational entities. Diplomats no longer monopolize international relations. Diaspora discourse is one of many elements of globalization which lead to the increasing “inter-dependence” we now live with. The transit of influence, capital, and culture throughout the Chinese diaspora demonstrates its importance to the world-at-large. We must provide ways to integrate members of the overseas Chinese communities with their resident countries, while allowing them continued access to their ethnic network. This ‘fractional-assimilation’ will allow for good future relations between members of the Chinese diaspora and their resident countries, while ensuring the linkages provided by the transnational Chinese community, which are becoming increasingly beneficial to host countries, will remain.

One of the greatest challenges to effective ‘fractional-assimilation’ is the racialization of politics regarding the Chinese diaspora caused by the reification of ethnicity. This particularly difficult problem is clearly evidenced in the troubled relations between overseas Chinese and indigenous residents of many Southeast Asian countries. To ameliorate this difficulty it is important for members of the Chinese diaspora to maintain ties to their resident countries while building upon their relations in the overseas Chinese community. Investment in resident countries must be encouraged. Cross-cultural co-operation and understanding must be worked towards. If the benefits of cross-border ethnic economic integration are reserved for ethnic Chinese, discord will ensue between Chinese and their non-Chinese neighbours.

On the same note, the non-Chinese neighbours of overseas Chinese communities must do their part to help integrate diasporans. Chinese residing in countries where they are not the majority ethnic group must be allowed cultural and economic freedom. Freedom to express their cultural identity acts to make diasporans feel welcome, and at home. Investment in their country of residence creates an automatic vested interest in the well-being of the local economy. Identity must not be presented as an us-or-them choice. The Chinese diaspora must be encouraged to associate both within, and without itself. By enabling, and respecting hyphenated identities we make a large step towards successful ‘fractional-assimilation’.

Another challenge posed to ‘fractional-assimilation’ is an acute essentialization of the Chinese diaspora. While papers such as this one are useful to the study of general trends within the overseas Chinese community, it, and others like it, are guilty of essentializing this community and depriving its constituents of their individuality. This practice, especially when manifested within the populace at large, reduces overseas Chinese individuals to cogs in a great Asian wheel. Overseas Chinese are too often perceived as simply economic actors. Their identities are reduced by essentializing forces to business participants and capital accumulators. To allow for effective ‘fractional-assimilation’ we must be careful not to define overseas Chinese communities in this narrow manner but encourage a broad vibrant definition.

Traditional wisdom has assumed that strong diaspora act to weaken the nation state of residence. While a large organized overseas population is sometimes considered beneficial for a sending country it is often regarded as undesirable in the receiving countries. The loyalty of individuals who identify themselves as members of an ethnic diaspora, especially a diaspora with a strong nation-state homeland such as the Chinese, is often questioned within receiving countries.

However in an era of global trade and finance strong trans-national diasporic linkages can be interpreted as beneficial for both sending and receiving countries. Loyalty to a diaspora need not preclude loyal citizenship in the country of residence. Effective ‘fractional-assimilation’ requires us to allow for an updated form of national identity. No longer can, or should, we desire uni-dimensional political identity. The era of globalization requires us to nurture the transnational entities which act to inter-link the world, by allowing their constituents to freely associate and collaborate across national borders, while encouraging their acceptance at home. Now, and increasingly in the future, these linkages will act to encourage peace and prosperity.

Some countries, especially those whose populations consist largely of immigrants, have been working towards this updated form of national identity for some time. Within Canada we have the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. Unfortunately our doctrine of multiculturalism is essentially a national endeavour and largely ignores the trans-national implications of multiculturalism. The centralized bureaucratic approach of the act leaves the Minister charged with its implementation responsible for enhancing international multicultural relations. The Canadian government should instead enable a decentralized construction of transnational ties such as those informally created by the re-organization of the Chinese diaspora. This could be done via a number of initiatives. International conferences, like the meetings of the World Chinese Entrepreneurs or International Huaren Federation could be encouraged in Canada. International exchanges should be encouraged between academic, and business institutions in Canada and throughout the Chinese community.

Ultimately the ability of Canada and other societies to effectively co-exist with and capitalize on the existence of large, organized, transnational, ethnic communities is predicated upon allowing for a more cosmopolitan and sophisticated form of national identity. If one allows a more complex as opposed to binary relationship between self and political identity, diasporism can be seen as inclusive in a globalized conception of identity. However if one relies upon a binary inclusive/exclusive self/other interpretation of national/political identity diasporas can be interpreted as a force which weakens the state and the nation. We must embrace the complexity of identity which is necessary for us to thrive in an increasingly complex world, by doing so we will reap more benefits from increasingly organized global actors such as the Chinese diaspora.

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