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May 24, 2006

Prince Rupert Puts Hope in New Asian-Focused Container Port

Prince Rupert, British Columbia is in the midst of developing new container handling facilities, which upon completion will make it the closest North American container port to Asia. The developers and citizens of Prince Rupert hope this proximity will bring with it a steady stream of goods imported from Asia for the North American market. And with those goods will hopefully come jobs.

Sailing from Shanghai to Prince Rupert instead of Vancouver shaves 435 miles or 36 hours off of the sailing time. Furthermore, the new facility hopes to have the goods off the ship and on the highway/railway faster than other busier ports which are for the most part located in urban areas. The downside of course is the same thing which lends Prince Rupert its advantage, that is to say its location. While goods might get from Shanghai to Prince Rupert 36 hours faster than to Vancouver, they end up in Prince Rupert. The lucrative American, and Central Canadian markets are much further away. Hopefully the cooperation of CN Rail will ensure reliable and fast transit links to help mitigate Prince Rupert's geographic difficulties.

Link: http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/1310AP_Canada_Port_of_Prince_Rupert.html

More Aeronautic News

Two Eastern Canadian companies scored sizable contracts with Chinese companies this weekend. CAE has agreed to supply three new flight training simulators to Cathay Pacific at a cost of $48million cdn. Perhaps more of a breakthrough is Moncton Flight College's deal with Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics to provide pilot training for up to 100 Chinese pilots per year. The deal is worth approximately $60million cdn. over a 5 year term.

Links: Embassy press release about Flight College announcement
Embassy press release about CAE announcement

Air China joins the Star Alliance

Today brought good news for Canadians who travel abroad on the country's main international air carrier Air Canada. Air China Limited (not to be confused with Taiwan based China Airlines) has joined the international Airline network Star Alliance. This move will allow for more booking options (ie. code-sharing flights) as well as more chances to accumulate the Star Alliance mileage points (ie. Aeroplan) of one's choice.

Link: http://www.noticias.info/asp/aspComunicados.asp?nid=180794&src=0

May 22, 2006

Ontario's Auto Sector Upset Over South Korean Free Trade Talks

Canada's Auto Sector is showing concern that on-going free trade talks with South Korea will be harmful to their industry. South Korea enjoys a very large trade surplus with Canada, this surplus is mostly due to its automotive and electronics industries, .

Auto industry representatives appear to have started a consciousness raising campaign. I've provided a link to one of the letters to the editor I recently read on the topic. It is important to note that the trade figures quoted in the letter deal only with automotive products. It doesn't address other industries who trade with South Korea. For a clearer picture of the numbers see here.

http://www.woodstocksentinelreview.com/story.php?id=231317

May 20, 2006

Harper talks up the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate

While meeting with Australian PM John Howard, Steven Harper hinted that Canada may join the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APPCDC), while removing itself from the global Kyoto agreement. The Asia-Pacific Partnership focuses on technology transfers to limit emissions. Unlike Kyoto it does not have set emission levels. The set emission levels of Kyoto never seemed to matter to Canada anyway. We're 35% above our 1990 emission levels when our target is 6% below those levels.

While the APPCDC doesn't have enforceable goals, it isn't necessarily a waste of time or effort. It's member countries (the USA, China, Japan, India, Australia, & South Korea) make up for about 50% of world emissions. If newer technology development is indeed encouraged under the agreement, and then transferred from the more advanced countries to countries with large and growing emissions like China and India it could take a bite out of global emissions.

While in the long term coal isn't a solution to energy problems, clean coal technology can at least make it a more palatable short term solution. The major problem with clean coal technology is the hesitance of governments to mandate it's usage. This is an area agreements like APPCDC could make a difference. They could buy rights to the technology, and freely distribute/subsidize it to at least temporarily reduce emissions.

In the long term, nuclear power is going to play a big part in supplying energy while reducing emissions. Tony Blair, George Bush, John Howard, and Steven Harper all recently suggested that new nuclear development is likely in the future. This could be a boon for Canada's uranium mining industry and possibiily even lead to sales of some Candu reactors depending upon which countries are involved in new development. The issue of waste disposal/protection is still debatable.

The Americans have recently suggested the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) which would encourage new nuclear development while trying to track fuel from mining, through usage, and ultimately disposal. It may make uranium exporting coutries like Canada responsible for waste disposal. The goal is to encourage nuclear develoment in more countries while not increasing the number of nuclear waste sites. This avoids increasing the likelihood of waste "going missing."

The GNEP is an interesting proposal, and could potentially greatly reduce global CO2 emissions (especially if electric transportation technology improves and usage increases). However, it will be a very hard sell to the citizens of countries like Canada and Australia.

News Story: http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=4470fea8-8f09-4e06-80b7-801f2e9116df&k=77828

May 19, 2006

Background: Conflict in Afghanistan

Canadian forces are currently undertaking a dangerous, but essential mission in helping the Afghani government maintain control of it's territory while assisting in the fight against a seemingly re-organized Taliban resistance. The Taliban should have been removed from power in the 1990's before they could go about their repressive ways, arbitrarily murdering those they disagreed with or who dared to disagree with them, while systematically suppressing the rights of everyone within the country. Now that the world has begun the job of rebuilding Afghanistan it can't in good conscience pick up and leave again until the job is done. Otherwise we risk letting the people of that country, who have lived with violence and oppression for so long, fall once again under it's oppressive sway.

Background:

1839-1842: The First Anglo-Afghan War. Nervous about Russian encroachment on India, the jewel of the empire, The British decide they need an ally on their North-Western frontier. They back Shah Shujah in his bid for the throne. This proves highly unpopular with most Afghanis, and results in the destruction of the entire British force (save a few prisoners, and Dr. W. Brydon who survived to tell the tale).

1878-1880: The Second Anglo-Afghan War. Upset with a number of high profile incidents involving their citizens, and facing diplomatic rebuke the British invade Afghanistan again. Rather more successful than the first attempt they sign a treaty granting them control of Afghani external affairs, effectively allowing them to turn away Russian encroachment.

1880-1901: Amir Abdhur Rahman Khan rules Afghanistan. He maintains much internal control of Afghani policy. The British and Russians decide Afghanistan will act as a buffer state seperating their Central Asian interests.

1919-1929:
King Amannulah Khan's rule sees the Third Anglo-Afghan War. This conflict results in complete independence given to Afghanistan. Extensive internal and external reforms take place. Formal relations are established with many countries including the newly founded Soviet Union. Social reform includes increased education, and increased civil rights including the right of women to go unveiled.

1929-1973: Mohammed Nadir Khan becomes King, is assasinated in 1933, and succeded by his son Mohammed Zahird Shah who rules until a coup in 1973. Afghanistan modernizes in many ways, while maintaining balance by placating tribal, religious, and ideological interests.

1973-1978:
A coup sees Afghanistan's monarchy disappear and establishes a republic with former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan as leader. Daoud is seen as a strong-arm leader who drifts slowly to the right over the course of his rule. Relations with the USSR are maintained, but cool over the period. Daoud is shot in a coup in 1978.

1978-1992:
The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is established following the communist led coup. Much of the Afghani ruling elite is killed, or fleas the country. A treaty is signed with the USSR in late '78, and minor Soviet military aid and troops arrive in Afghanistan in early '79 to help the ruling People's Democraticy Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) maintain control of the country.

Full Soviet invasion comes in late 1979. The reasons for invasion are arguable, but include worries that socialism in Afghanistan was at risk, fears Afghanistan was drifting towards alignment with China, and concerns that the unstable situation in Afghanistan may result in unwanted chaos too close to Soviet borders. Soviet forces change the leadership at the top of the PDPA, while attempting to pacify the country. The factionalism that had been simmering before Soviet invasion becomes full scale civil war. Mujahudeen rise up around the country to battle the PDPA and their Soviet backers.

Mujahudeen are supported by outside forces including the USA and Saudi Arabia. The war becomes a quagmire for the Soviets, and an international hot button issue. Eventual Soviet withdrawal is negotiated and comes in 1989. Afghanistan is left in a state of chaos as the Mujahudeen continue their fight against the government, which is still recognized by the United Nations. Three years of civil war ensue. The Afghani government retains political ties with the Soviet Union which continues to provide financial and military aid.

By nineteen ninety-four we see the fall of the Soviet Union and end of aid to Afghanistan's government. The Mujahudeen defeat the government forces, but lack organization and planning to enact their own effective government. Factionalism and warlordism ensue

1994-2001:
The Taliban gain control of most of factionalized Afghanistan. With significan support from Pakistan, hardline Islamic Taliban forces take control of the country. They impose strict Shariah law regulating the lives of citizens across the country. Females are forbidden to pursue education, work outside the home, or appear in public without a full burkah. Religious life is highly regulated. Men's beard lengths are legislated by religious officials.

Widespread human rights abuses occur, reciving some international media attention. International attention is most focused when the regime decides to destroy two ancient statues of Buddah located in Bamiyan. This is part of the governments attempt to wipe out all non-Islamic influences including music, dancing, disagreeable writing and the collection of the Kabul Museum. In 1998 in response to the embassy bombing in Kenya and Tanzania President Clinton launches a cruise missile attack against purported terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

2001-Present:
As a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, The United States and a collection of allies invade Afghanistan for harbouring Osama Bin Laden, the figurehead of Al Qaeda, and for providing terrorist training to Al Qaeda forces. The coalition backed Northern Alliance defeats the Taliban and takes control of the country. Harmid Karzai is elected President by a Grand Council. Rebuilding of Afghanistan begins.

Banditry, warlordism, and most especially a resurgence of Taliban resistance remain important issues for Afghani security. The country is at a delicate and important point in its history. Support for an Afghanistan which shows greater respect for human rights, and the voices of its citizens can help bring stability to this region of the world which has been wracked with instability for so long.

Canadian forces are currently undertaking a dangerous, but essential mission in helping the Afghani government maintain control of it's territory while assisting in the fight against a seemingly re-organized Taliban resistance. The Taliban should have been removed from power in the 1990's before they could go about their repressive ways, arbitrarily murdering individuals they disagreed with, and systematically suppressing the rights of everyone within the country. Now that the world has begun the job of rebuilding Afghanistan it can't in good conscience pick up and leave again until the job is done. Otherwise we risk letting the people of that country, who have lived with violence and oppression for so long, fall once again under it's oppressive sway.

Ancient Chinese Settlement in Cape Breton?

The National featured a report yesterday on former Yale architecture professor Paul Chiasson's claim that some indistinct ruins in central Cape Breton are remnants of an ancient Chinese settlement. Chiasson originally made headlines last summer with the claims. The CBC was reporting again, as their camera crews were led to the heretofore secret site. It looks, to the untrained eye, like a rather old and unremarkable arrangement of stones.

As their hypotheses are rather complimentary, Chiasson has teamed up with Gavin Menzies author of 1421: The Year China Discoverd the World to promote his idea. Anyone interested in these theories should not only read Chiasson and Menzie's work, but some of the multitudinous refutations by scholars from around the world. Menzies plays fast and loose with his facts, and it seems that Chiasson's claims while remaining marginally within the realms of possibility are likely incorrect. It's much more probable that the ruins are remnants of a farm dating from the 18th-19th century.

Nortel and China's Ministry of Rail Do a Deal

Beleagured Nortel Networks have signed a deal to provide GSM switching equipment to China Rail Networks on passenger lines in twenty Chinese provinces.

http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2006/05/19/afx2758616.html

Nova Scotia hosts "royal" Tibetan wedding

Halifax, Nova Scotia will play host to a wedding on June 10th between Sakyong Jamgon Mipham the leader of the international Shambala Buddhist movement, and Tseyang Palmo a Tibetan "Princess."

Nova Scotia has a thriving buddhist population, with the Shambala movement and its followers making up a significant portion of that. Considering the size of Nova Scotia's Asian population relative to other areas of Canada like Ontario and Vancouver, the success it has had in luring international religious organizations of Asian origin is impressive. Not only is it home to the Shambala headquarters as well as other Buddhist organizations, but Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's organization announced last year they would build a huge "meditation palace" in Nova Scotia.

http://www.thechronicleherald.ca/Metro/504301.html

May 18, 2006

Afghanistan Mission Extended

Parliament voted today to officially support a two year extension of the Canadian mission to Afghanistan. This will see Canadian troops in Afghanistan until at least early 2009. Ultimately this is good news for Canadian interests and the world at large. While in an ideal world Canada would be able to stick to, what Jack Layton calls its traditional role of peacekeeping, the world is not perfect. Sometimes the peace can't be kept, and states need to be rebuilt from the ground up. Afghanistan is such a state that, if only for humanitarian reasons, needs the assistance of the world at large to re-establish itself as a viable state, with the ability to offer its citizens a safe, and enjoyable life.

The world can't leave Afghanistan now. Not only would it be a disaster for millions of Afghanis who could very well fall again under the rule, official or not, of the oppressive Taliban, but it would also be detrimental for global security. The argument made by people like Cindy Sheehan and her supporters that Canada is effectively supporting the US war in Iraq by having our troops in Afghanistan is misleading and falacious. This poor logic would prohibit Canada from participating in any overseas security mission that the United States is also participating in. It is short-sighted, and certainly not in the best interests of Canada or the world at large.

It was not long ago that people were asking the world to pay attention to the lives of Afghanis oppressed under the Taliban. September 11th brought the world's attention quickly, and we shouldn't let that attention fade until the situation in Afghanistan is improved. It's for the good of Afghanistan, and the good of the world.

http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/05/17/afghandebate05172006.html

May 17, 2006

The Re-Organization of the Chinese Diaspora: Changing Identities

While the Chinese diaspora has existed, in one way or another, for many hundreds of years it has undergone a process of re-organization over the past four decades. Revolutions in communications, travel, and international activity have led to increasing ease of association within the overseas Chinese community. This has resulted in increased transnational activity within the Chinese diaspora, which in some ways has subverted traditional national borders and identities. Our answers to the questions of how best to handle this transformation and what it means to the future of immigrant societies such as Canada will help determine our national identity in years to come.

Introduction

The emergence of an increasingly unified Overseas Chinese community brings to light debate over changing forms of ethnic and national organization in today’s globalizing world. New diasporic visualizations are gaining power, and relevance. The traditional nation-state’s monopoly on international influence is increasingly being shared with other actors. Some of that influence is becoming vested in transnational ethnic communities. The Chinese diaspora demonstrates this transference of power from traditional centralized authority to a dispersed, globalized community.

While the Chinese diaspora has existed, in one way or another, for many hundreds of years it has undergone a process of re-organization over the past four decades. Revolutions in communications, travel, and international activity have led to increasing ease of association within the overseas Chinese community. This has resulted in increased transnational activity within the Chinese diaspora, which in some ways has subverted traditional national borders and identities. Our answers to the questions of how best to handle this transformation and what it means to the future of immigrant societies such as Canada will help determine our national identity in years to come.

It is important to note that any study of group relations, such as this one risks reducing the individual’s identity to simply that of a group member. The overseas Chinese community is a complex, variegated one. Divisions exist along linguistic, class, demographic, and sub-ethnic lines. Constituents of the Chinese diaspora do not necessarily identify themselves as such. I seek only to trace some of the general trends within the overseas Chinese community and its relations with other populations. By no means do these generalities apply to all members of the community in all areas of the world.

A Short History of the Overseas Chinese

China has been an immigrant sending area for many hundreds of years. The original migrants were mostly males originating from the south of China. They traveled overseas throughout Southeast Asia as merchants. In 1567 China legalized maritime trade and began sending 50 junks per year to the region. This quickly gave rise to a large Chinese trading network in port cities. These cities such as Manila, Patani, the Dutch port of Batavia, and many others all came to have large Chinese populations. Traders settled to do business in the cities and integrated with the local societies to varying degrees.

The seventeenth century saw sustained commercial activity, and increasing political migration. The Qing and Ming authorities sent soldiers and advisors throughout the Indochinese peninsula to establish pro-China polities, and influence the policies of other established kingdoms.

The establishment of Bangkok by Rama I, a half-Chinese half-Thai prince, led to a great increase in Chinese representation in Southeast Asian trade. Traders of Chinese descent dominated shipping into and out of Bangkok. The Chinese population of Siam became economically essential to the maintenance of the Siamese state. At the same time, Chinese miners were immigrating into the small states of the Southeast Asian archipelago. These merchants, miners, and other Chinese settlers would eventually come to dominate commercial exchange in these regions.

This period between the sixteenth and nineteenth century forms the first important wave of Chinese migration. This wave was directed primarily at the trading areas of Southeast Asia, and led to significant Chinese minorities having disproportionate control of the economic sectors in the region. The next wave of migration came between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. This saw an influx of Chinese migrants into areas across the world. North America, Europe, Australasia, and even Africa to a degree, became home to Chinese populations. These migrants were aimed not so much at the trading centres as the peripheries of these societies. Chinese labourers came and took menial jobs within the nascent states of North and South America, and in European colonies worldwide. Eventually these Chinese, like their Southeast Asian predecessors, would be drawn to the cities in these new countries.

The final wave of migration, which is still taking place today, is focused directly at the centres of established, developed countries. Large cities are now the destination of choice. Instead of consisting of principally physical labourers, the new wave of migration is formed of a variety of individuals. Males, females, rich, poor, educated, and uneducated all are represented within the body of recent Chinese migrants. Migration to Western countries experienced a surge during the 1980s and 1990s, when uncertainty about the 1997 reunification of China and Hong Kong led many Hong Kong citizens to seek alternate citizenship.

Like people throughout the developed world, the newly arrived Chinese and their now well-established predecessors are increasingly mobile and have access to revolutionary forms of communication. Space has shrunken within the Chinese diaspora. We now see mobilization across the community and expression of a more unified identity. Over the past thirty years the ties that bind the worldwide Chinese community have, in many ways, strengthened.

Diaspora Re-Organized

Increasing mobility and access to communication has contributed to a re-organization of global diaspora. While it was once almost untenable for overseas Chinese to maintain extensive ties with other overseas communities and mainland China, it is now possible to maintain many relationships across the globe simultaneously. This new ease of relating has led to improved relationships, which has subsequently led to an increased sense of unity within the Chinese diaspora.

The increasing unity of identity within Overseas Chinese communities is dependent upon a reification of Chinese ethnicity. Individuals whose families have lived away from China for over a century are as entitled to membership in the Chinese diaspora as those who migrated from Hong Kong in the 1990s, provided they can demonstrate ethnic ties to China. Ties between Overseas Chinese communities, and to China - whether emotional, kinship, economic, or physical – are becoming stronger and stronger. The on-going discourses regarding Chinese values, Confucianism, Pacific business, and greater China have led to more wide spread agreement on what it is to be Chinese. Arif Dirlik points to these discourses and their effects upon the Overseas Chinese community when he identifies the “re-sinicization” of the Chinese diaspora.

This ‘re-sinicization’ has had a number of causes and effects. High on the list of causes is the re-emergence of China as an important global power, and the increased accessibility of China for physical return and capital investment. Accentuating ties to China has been a profitable exercise for many elements of the Overseas Chinese community. Access to cheap labour and a growing middle-class market has brought investment flooding into China. The constituents of the Chinese diaspora are particularly well placed to take advantage of these markets, and it has thus been within their interest to articulate their ‘Chineseness’ to the fullest extent possible.

Ien Ang argues that the increasing awareness of the Chinese diaspora and the ‘re-sinicization’ thereof has been propelled by a desire to “belong to a respectable imagined community…[which] is so much larger and more encompassing…than any territorially bounded nation.” While this emotional desire for belonging may indeed play a role in the re-organization of the Chinese diaspora, Ang’s further comment that diaspora “signifies triumph over the shackles of the nation-state and national identity” suggests that membership in diaspora precludes ascribing to a national identity. This is an overly exclusive interpretation of identity. Claims such as these endanger diasporans globally by suggesting they cannot remain loyal to both their resident states, and their ethnic brethren. Members within the Chinese diaspora can orient themselves toward China, and other Overseas Chinese, in many ways, and still remain loyal and valuable citizens of their resident states. These citizens nurture multiple loyalties remaining true to their transnational compatriots as well as their fellow citizens in their state of residence.

Historically the Chinese diaspora has been divided quite clearly upon linguistic lines. Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, Mandarin, and other dialect speakers at one time organized within their own respective communities. However the re-organization of the Chinese diaspora has led to a rise in the popularity of the Mandarin dialect. The choice of both the PRC and the Republic of China on Taiwan to select Mandarin as the official language has lent it an official air, and given knowledge of it value as a business skill in China. Increasingly members of the Chinese diaspora choose to learn Mandarin as a supplement to, or even as, their primary dialect. Singapore’s learn Mandarin first campaign is an excellent example of this drive towards a linguistic unity.

The re-organization of the Chinese diaspora has had a number of impacts upon the community itself and the world at large. Contributing to Dirlik’s concept of ‘re-sinicization’, Aihwa Ong identifies the rising importance of Confucian culture which binds together disparate populations of Overseas Chinese, as one of these impacts. Ong argues, very convincingly, that the new-found influence of Asians in global affairs has enabled them to participate more actively in the definition of ‘Oriental’. Contrary to Said’s one-sided definition of Orientalism as an act engaged in by the West upon the East, Ong claims that the Chinese diaspora now takes part in Orientalizing itself. This has led to increasing importance of Confucian values to individuals who very likely have never read any Confucius, which in turn has led in many cases to a justification of the male dominated social order within the Chinese diaspora. Oriental identity is increasingly being essentialized by Orientals themselves.
This new-found ability to articulate a coherent cultural identity has enabled the overseas Chinese community to present an alternative to Western modernity. By drawing upon the cultures within their respective resident communities and the new internationalized Chinese culture, the Chinese diaspora has created a collection of hybrid identities. These hybrid identities are at ease relating with their surrounding communities, with other Overseas Chinese communities, and with communities in China.

This ease of inter-relating is demonstrated by the organizations which act to unite Overseas Chinese communities together, and with the homeland, and in the organizations which help to integrate Overseas Chinese communities in their countries of residence. In 1991, what amounts to an international Chinese chamber of commerce was established with the advent of the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention. This group meets every two years to build relations between business people of Chinese ethnicity. In a similar vein The World Huaren Federation’s mission is to develop relations within the Chinese diaspora, and between overseas Chinese and their non-Chinese neighbours. The equivalent organization within China is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, which is charged with promoting interaction between established overseas Chinese, new migrants, and mainlanders. One of the major functions of the office is to promote business links between overseas Chinese and the mainland. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities see a valuable source of investment in overseas Chinese communities.

These various organizations and government ministries are manifestations of the increasing inter-connectedness of the Chinese diaspora. As well as providing clear examples of diasporic organization, these associations provide forums within which Diasporic identity discourse may take place. What it is to be an overseas Chinese is increasingly being defined by the actions, publications, and policies of these global associations.

The Chinese Diaspora in an International World System

The Chinese diaspora has had various impacts upon the international order. The act of migration itself, moving populations from one region to others, changes the composure of the world. Likewise, shifting identities and changing relations can act to transform the way the international system is ordered.

Perhaps the country most profoundly affected by the emergence of an organized Chinese diaspora is China itself. Between the founding of the PRC, and the Deng Xiaoping era, migration from China was officially perceived as undesirable. It was discouraged via a complex, and highly regulated passport system. However, in more recent years migration has become increasingly encouraged by the PRC. Migration is now seen as one of many modernizing, internationalizing forces that are helping to strengthen China, and develop stronger international relations. The transformation of PRC policy towards migrants is expressed in the change of the official stance towards student migrants. The slogan for overseas students used to be “return and serve” it has now been changed to “serve the country.” This change is the result of Beijing’s acknowledgment that some overseas students will not return to China. Nonetheless, the regime attempts to retain relations with these students, and encourages them to maintain loyalties to China during their overseas residency, no matter how long it may be.

Diasporan investment in mainland China has been another consequence of the re-organization of diaspora. While it is difficult to procure statistics on which investment is backed by ethnic Chinese, we can look to investment in China from ASEAN countries as an indicator of increased Diasporan investment. Investment from ASEAN countries into China has increased from $42.8 million US dollars in 1979 to $3289 million in 2001. While this investment is not strictly from ethnically Chinese sources, we can extrapolate from the Chinese representation within ASEAN economies that it a significant portion of it is invested by ethnic Chinese interests. This investment within China by the diaspora community acts to strengthen the relationship between overseas Chinese and the mainland from both perspectives. Overseas Chinese are anxious to maintain, and improve relations in China, and mainlanders are very interested in procuring as much investment, especially ethnic Chinese investment, as possible. Ethnic Chinese investment is perceived as more desirable by mainland Chinese governments and industries. It is believed that familial and geographic ties between overseas Chinese and China creates investors with a greater stake in the well-being of China. Many of these investors are indeed important philanthropists within China.

Due to historical circumstances Southeast Asia has by far the largest portion of the world’s roughly twenty-five million overseas Chinese. Approximately twenty million people within Southeast Asia identify themselves as Chinese. This does not include much of the population which is of mixed Chinese/other origin. Apart from Singapore, the Chinese communities within these countries are minority populations. The re-organization of the Chinese diaspora has had varying impacts upon the region.

The Chinese percentage of the total population varies greatly amongst Southeast Asian countries, from Singapore’s 77% to Myanmar’s 0.7%. The integration of Chinese communities has also varied greatly throughout the region. Chinese business people control a disproportionate share of the economy in most of these countries. This has led to intermittent strife between local populations and Chinese communities.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 brought much of this discord to the surface, especially in Indonesia. Although the Chinese communities within Indonesia are well-established, with some families able to trace their Indonesian residence back hundreds of years, animosities between indigenous Indonesians and Chinese have been on the rise. The perceived unity of the Chinese community and their links to other Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, and on the mainland, have led some indigenous Indonesians to assume that the loyalties of the Chinese lie more with their ethnic brethren than with the Indonesian nation. When the economy collapsed in 1997-1998 many Indonesians blamed it upon the business activities of the Chinese. This led to anti-Chinese riots and gang-rapes in 1998 as the Chinese community was scapegoated for the plight of the economy.

In some ways the emergence of a stronger Chinese diaspora acts to upset the position of the Chinese within some Southeast Asian societies. Diasporic organization can be perceived as kabalistic, and these interpretations can provide fuel for ethnic strife. This divisive aspect of diaspora is not directly attributable to the diaspora itself, rather responsibility for these occurrences lies with the host culture. Ethnic division and resident country integration must be examined and developed to maintain the viability and health of the Chinese diaspora.

The Chinese diaspora experience in the New World has been quite different from that in the Southeast Asia. After about a century of marginalization the removal of racially discriminatory immigration laws and the introduction of various doctrines of multi-culturalism have legitimized hyphenated identities, such as Chinese-Canadian, or Asian-Australian. While anti-Asian racism does still exist in these countries the Chinese diaspora has become relatively well integrated into the resident societies. That said, the changes that have taken place within the overseas Chinese communities over the past few decades have led to a division within the New World Chinese communities. Those Chinese who immigrated in previous generations and those who are economic immigrants form one part of the community, while the upwardly mobile capitalist immigrants form the other. Constituents of the first section of the community are generally more integrated into their resident societies, while the latter have a more flexible interpretation of citizenship.

The capitalist immigrants hail largely from Hong Kong, and Taiwan. They remain upwardly mobile, often working on one side of the Pacific and residing on the other. The new organization of the Chinese diaspora, which has been repeatedly referred to here, is best represented within this segment of the population. These individuals form composite citizenships, and in fact often hold multiple passports. They retain strong ties to the communities in their sending countries and build ties in their receiving countries. At the same time they participate in the global network of overseas Chinese, and deal extensively with the Chinese communities in their new resident countries. This particular portion of the Chinese diaspora has been essential in increasing exchange and discourse between the New World, the overseas Chinese communities, and China itself.

In many ways the Chinese diaspora has contributed to the weakening of national borders, and traditional definitions of the nation state. Arif Dirlik expresses this well when he states that “what diaspora discourse challenges is not nationalism per se, but a nationalism that is premised on the coincidence of state, territory, population, and culture.”
The upwardly mobile nature of the new diasporans and their capital has created a force to be reckoned with on the international stage. While suggesting a monolithic unity of intent or action to the Chinese diaspora would be a mistake, there certainly have been trends within the past few decades suggesting that this community has come to an increasingly unified cultural visualization. China has certainly benefited from the increased influence and power of this community. How other countries have reacted, and will react in the future, to the emerging importance of global diaspora has been, and will be, very important for the future of the international order.

New Interpretations of Nationalism

New interpretations of nationalism must be allowed to address the weakening of the traditional definitions of nationalism caused by the re-organization of the Chinese diaspora, and other transnational entities. Diplomats no longer monopolize international relations. Diaspora discourse is one of many elements of globalization which lead to the increasing “inter-dependence” we now live with. The transit of influence, capital, and culture throughout the Chinese diaspora demonstrates its importance to the world-at-large. We must provide ways to integrate members of the overseas Chinese communities with their resident countries, while allowing them continued access to their ethnic network. This ‘fractional-assimilation’ will allow for good future relations between members of the Chinese diaspora and their resident countries, while ensuring the linkages provided by the transnational Chinese community, which are becoming increasingly beneficial to host countries, will remain.

One of the greatest challenges to effective ‘fractional-assimilation’ is the racialization of politics regarding the Chinese diaspora caused by the reification of ethnicity. This particularly difficult problem is clearly evidenced in the troubled relations between overseas Chinese and indigenous residents of many Southeast Asian countries. To ameliorate this difficulty it is important for members of the Chinese diaspora to maintain ties to their resident countries while building upon their relations in the overseas Chinese community. Investment in resident countries must be encouraged. Cross-cultural co-operation and understanding must be worked towards. If the benefits of cross-border ethnic economic integration are reserved for ethnic Chinese, discord will ensue between Chinese and their non-Chinese neighbours.

On the same note, the non-Chinese neighbours of overseas Chinese communities must do their part to help integrate diasporans. Chinese residing in countries where they are not the majority ethnic group must be allowed cultural and economic freedom. Freedom to express their cultural identity acts to make diasporans feel welcome, and at home. Investment in their country of residence creates an automatic vested interest in the well-being of the local economy. Identity must not be presented as an us-or-them choice. The Chinese diaspora must be encouraged to associate both within, and without itself. By enabling, and respecting hyphenated identities we make a large step towards successful ‘fractional-assimilation’.

Another challenge posed to ‘fractional-assimilation’ is an acute essentialization of the Chinese diaspora. While papers such as this one are useful to the study of general trends within the overseas Chinese community, it, and others like it, are guilty of essentializing this community and depriving its constituents of their individuality. This practice, especially when manifested within the populace at large, reduces overseas Chinese individuals to cogs in a great Asian wheel. Overseas Chinese are too often perceived as simply economic actors. Their identities are reduced by essentializing forces to business participants and capital accumulators. To allow for effective ‘fractional-assimilation’ we must be careful not to define overseas Chinese communities in this narrow manner but encourage a broad vibrant definition.

Traditional wisdom has assumed that strong diaspora act to weaken the nation state of residence. While a large organized overseas population is sometimes considered beneficial for a sending country it is often regarded as undesirable in the receiving countries. The loyalty of individuals who identify themselves as members of an ethnic diaspora, especially a diaspora with a strong nation-state homeland such as the Chinese, is often questioned within receiving countries.

However in an era of global trade and finance strong trans-national diasporic linkages can be interpreted as beneficial for both sending and receiving countries. Loyalty to a diaspora need not preclude loyal citizenship in the country of residence. Effective ‘fractional-assimilation’ requires us to allow for an updated form of national identity. No longer can, or should, we desire uni-dimensional political identity. The era of globalization requires us to nurture the transnational entities which act to inter-link the world, by allowing their constituents to freely associate and collaborate across national borders, while encouraging their acceptance at home. Now, and increasingly in the future, these linkages will act to encourage peace and prosperity.

Some countries, especially those whose populations consist largely of immigrants, have been working towards this updated form of national identity for some time. Within Canada we have the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. Unfortunately our doctrine of multiculturalism is essentially a national endeavour and largely ignores the trans-national implications of multiculturalism. The centralized bureaucratic approach of the act leaves the Minister charged with its implementation responsible for enhancing international multicultural relations. The Canadian government should instead enable a decentralized construction of transnational ties such as those informally created by the re-organization of the Chinese diaspora. This could be done via a number of initiatives. International conferences, like the meetings of the World Chinese Entrepreneurs or International Huaren Federation could be encouraged in Canada. International exchanges should be encouraged between academic, and business institutions in Canada and throughout the Chinese community.

Ultimately the ability of Canada and other societies to effectively co-exist with and capitalize on the existence of large, organized, transnational, ethnic communities is predicated upon allowing for a more cosmopolitan and sophisticated form of national identity. If one allows a more complex as opposed to binary relationship between self and political identity, diasporism can be seen as inclusive in a globalized conception of identity. However if one relies upon a binary inclusive/exclusive self/other interpretation of national/political identity diasporas can be interpreted as a force which weakens the state and the nation. We must embrace the complexity of identity which is necessary for us to thrive in an increasingly complex world, by doing so we will reap more benefits from increasingly organized global actors such as the Chinese diaspora.

Bibliography

Ang, Ien. “Together-In-Difference: Beyond Diaspora, Into
Hybridity” Asian Studies, vol. 27 no. 2. (2003) pp. 141-154.

Canadian Multiculturalism Act. 5(2)
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-18.7/32217.html

Cheung, Gordon C.K. “Chinese Diaspora as a Virtual Nation:
Interactive Roles between Economic and Social Capital”
Political Studies vol. 52 (2004) pp. 664-683.

Dirlik, Arif. “Intimate Others: [private] nations and diasporas
in an age of globalization” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies”
vol. 5 no. 3, (2004) pp. 491-502.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence
New York: Longman, 2001.

Mackie, Jamie. “Thinking About the Chinese Overseas” American
Asian Review vol 21 no. 4. (2003) pp. 1-45.

Nyiri, Pal. “Expatriating is Patriotic? The discourse on ‘new
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World Huaren Federation, http://www.huaren.org

Ommundsen, Wenche. “Tough Ghosts: Modes of Cultural Belonging in
Diaspora” Asian Studies Review vol. 27 no. 2 (2003) pp.
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Ong, Aihwa. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of
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Ong, Aihwa and Donald Nonini eds. Ungrounded Empires: The
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pp. 21-48.

The Chinese are coming.

Chinese foreign tourism is growing at an incredible rate. Canada was recently listed amongst the countries PRC citizens are allowed to visit without having to procure special paperwork. This could potentially have a very good payoff for tourism industries in Canada, especially in the West. Increased marketing inititives, and better services for Chinese tourists are important for market development.

The benefits needn't be limited to the West either. Chinese tourists flock to Marx's house in Trier. I see no reason they wouldn't also head to Norman Bethune's cabin in Ontario if it were well marketed (the reaction of the citizens of Gravenhurst is another matter). And if the Japanese are willing to travel to PEI in droves there is potential for similar popularity with the Chinese.

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/16/news/tourism.php

China says: "What Spies?"

In an unsurprising move, China refuted allegations that it has agents in Canada engaging in economic espionage. It is interesting to note that no mention is made of other covert activities, including monitoring and possible threatening of Chinese democracy movements active within Canada.

Peter Mckay would be well advised to tread softly here. This issue is touchy for the Chinese, singing to the media about it isn't likely to be of much help. But all that said, the government needs to assist companies like Research in Motion (Chinese state run telecom companies recently released a "Redberry" ripoff of their "Blackberry" email gadget) in protecting their intellectual property.
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/04/20/canada.china.ap/

May 16, 2006

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Welcome to Canadian-Asian Affairs. This is a new website started by me: Ryan Whalen with the goal of tracking, and elucidating relations between Canada and Asia. Important current affairs will be highlighted, and more indepth feature articles will be presented to compliment the news coverage.

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